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wards the risk of arrestation and punishment, and at the same
time have different skills with respect to general organization
tasks, crime realization or detection avoidance activities (i.e. al-
lowing to reduce the probability of detection). In this set up, we
first compare two regimes of exclusive sanctions (either the sanc-
tions are borne by the Principal/beneficiary of the crime, or they
are borne by the Agent/perpetrator of the crime), and we ana-
lyze the comparative efficiency of the various instruments which
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1 Introduction
A criminal organization may be seen as an agency where the Principal
and the Agent have different sensibilities towards the risk of being caught
and punished, and at the same time have different skills with respect
to general organization tasks, crime realization or detection avoidance
activities (i.e. allowing to reduce the probability of detection). We in-
troduce a basic framework of criminal groups activity along this line in
order to compare two regimes of exclusive sanctions (either the sanctions
are borne by the Principal/beneficiary of the crime, or they are borne
by the Agent/perpetrator of the crime) depending on their social ben-
efits 1/ in terms of their deterrence effects of crime, 2/ in terms of the
probability of detection. Then we analyze the comparative efficiency of
the various instruments which are at the disposal of public authorities
to prevent corporation in criminal activities (frequency of control and
level of monetary penalties).
Concerning criminality team, it is often claimed in public opinion
that sanctions which are inflicted to the sleeping partner in a crime,
or to the beneficiary of a fraudulent act should be more heavy than
the punishments applied to the perpetrator of the offences who may
be sometimes entraped in the crime. On the other hand, that public
deterrence of criminal activity focuses at first on perpretators may be
explained by the existence of large costs of detection of Principals, as
compared to the small monitoring costs of Agents. Our results suggest
that, as far as there is no strict constraints on the resources allotted to
the control and repression of criminal activities (public authorities may
levy more and more resources to develop this activity), then the regime
with exclusive sanction on the perpretator always allows to obtain larger
deterrence effects on Principals than the regime of exclusive sanction on
the Principal, and that these advantages increase with the probability of
public control and detection. On the other hand, the regime of Agent’s
liability gives him more incentives to cheat, thus leading to a smaller
probability of detection of criminal activities.
We also find that under mild conditions about the choice of fines, the
regime of joint liability/mixed sanctions allows to obtain larger effects in
terms of crime deterrence than the regime of exclusive sanctions upon the
Principal; nevertheless, this also yields more difficulties in detecting the
crime, since the Agent have more incentives to invest in activities avoid-
ing public detection. In contrast, it yields (under reasonable conditions
regarding the choice of fines) less crime deterrence but more detection
than a regime of unilateral sanction upon the Agent.
Section 2 gives some related works on the topics. Section 3 describes
our framework and the main behavioral assumptions of the model. Then,
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in section 4, we characterize the optimal contract (effort,monetary trans-
fer) between the Principal and the Agent, in each regime of sanction
(exclusive sanction upon the Principal versus exclusive sanctions upon
the Agent). We show that exclusive sanctions upon the Agent allow to
obtain more compliance from the Principal, but induce higher efforts
in cheating from the Agent. Section 5 displays the complete compar-
ative statics of the model. Our results suggest that, as far as there is
no strict constraints on the resources allotted to the control and repres-
sion of criminal activities (public authorities may levy more and more
resources to develop this activity), the advantages in favour of a regime
of exclusive sanctions on Agents increase with the probability of public
control and detection. Section 6 studies the case for joint liability. We
show that it implies more deterrence than the regime of exclusive sanc-
tion upon the leader, but at a cost since « joint liability » also reduces
the effectiveness of public monitoring as compared to the second regime,
once again. It means that it is more efficient to punish both partners in
a criminal teams than the «stronger partner» (leader) alone, since the
probability of crime is smaller when both bear a sanction - albeit, the
frequency of detection of the team is smaller. In contrast, there is unfor-
tunately no reason to believe that it is also more efficient to punish both
partners than the « weaker » alone; maybe this is not the case: more
conditions over basic assumptions regarding the technology of avoidance
and individual preferences are required (not found here). Section 7 gives
a brief conclusion.
2 Related literature
At least three kinds of literature are worth mentioning, since this work
may be connected to each of them: corporate crime, gatekeepers and
criminal organizations.
Corporate crime. At a basic level, the issue of corporate crime has
been studied first with reference to employer-employee relationships.
Arlen (1994) puts the distinction that corporate crime is not crime com-
mitted by corporations, but corresponds to illegal activities undertaken
by individuals belonging to a corporation, but pursuing their own selfish
interest - even though the offence incidentally benefits the corporation.
Thus, the rational for corporate liability is that public monitoring of
corporate crimes is most of the time difficult and costly to implement,
enabling not enough (inefficient) deterrence, while in contrast, corpora-
tions have an advantage in detecting wrongdoings by their employees.
As a matter of fact, vicarious criminal liability (shifting liability from
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employees to the corporation) increases corporation’s enforcement ex-
penditures, thus increases the probability of detection and then reduces
the number of malicious employees who commit the offence. Never-
theless, Arlen’s analysis highlights the potentially perverse incentives of
strict vicarious liability, coming from opposite forces created by the very
increase in enforcement expenditures: as the probability of corporation’s
employees detection increases, so is the probability of public detection,
allowing the government to increase the corporation’s expected liabil-
ity for these crimes. As a result, strict vicarious liability may finally
lead a corporation to spend less in enforcement than it would absent of
vicarious liability: this occurs soon as the benefits of the reduction in
the number of offences committed by their employees fall well down the
expected costs associated to enforcement and liability. Chu and Qian
(1995) have argued that one solution to overcome the problem is to in-
troduce vicarious liability under a negligence rule. Specifically, courts
may provide enough incentives to induce from Principal honest reports
either by lowering the due care level or by lowering the level of delegated
liability.
Shavell (1997) observes that corporations have limited ability to pe-
nalize their wrongdoing employees. Although standard economic analy-
sis of compensation concludes that optimal damages must be set to the
value of harm, in practice corporations impose limited penalties on their
employees for causing harm to third parties, the major sanction imposed
being to be dismissed from their job. One way firms may remedy this
problem is by paying supernormal (above-market) wages: this is because
when the employee have more to lose when he commits an error or an
offense and is dismissed. Thus supernormal wages induce more care and
prevention of accidents. Nevertheless, private incentives of firm to the
use of above-market wages deviate from social ones. On the one hand,
this reflects that supernormal wages correspond to additional costs for
a firm, whereas it is not for society. On the other, market price of firm
product may exceed social costs, as they reflect the increase in the private
costs following the adoption of supernormal wage. Thus the undesirable
decrease in consumers’ purchases may render the setting of wage at a
lower level than harm socially advantageous.
Gatekeepers’ liability: auditors and lawyers. Recent corporate scan-
dals (Enron, Worldcom) since the begining of 2000s, and the even more
recent subprime crisis which has been the departure of a major financial
crisis at an international level, have made apparent the essential role of
professional service providers, such as auditors, corporate lawyers, and
securities analysts, in detecting and revealing corporate misconduct on
the part of their clients and at the same time, the failure of the internal
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control inside large diversified financial organizations. Kraakman (1986)
has revised the classical gatekeeping theory, clarifying that a gatekeep-
ing strategy requires gatekeepers "who can and will prevent misconduct
reliably, regardless of the preferences and market alternatives of wrong-
doers." After the historic debacle of Enron, there has been a renewal of
the debate, beginning with Coffee (2002) who has argued that "Enron
is a maddeningly idiosyncratic example of pathological corporate gover-
nance, which by itself cannot provide evidence of systematic governance
failure" but properly understood it can explain "why and when reliance
may not be justified on "reputational intermediaries," such as auditors,
securities analysts, attorneys. His proposal is to convert gatekeepers into
insurers, but cap their insurance obligations based on a multiple of the
highest annual revenues the gatekeepers recently had received from their
wrongdoing clients. Partnoy (2004) makes the point that the problem of
gatekeeper liability is a shift in scholarship view which had more focused
on reputation than on regulation or civil liability. Many scholars have
argued that liability should not be imposed on gatekeepers and that
reputation-related incentives alone would be sufficient. Partnoy com-
pares various proposals and concludes that a contractual system based
on a percentage of the issuer’s liability would be preferable to a reg-
ulatory system with caps based on a multiple of gatekeeper revenues.
Schäfer (2004) argues that a wrong audit that causes damages to share-
holders should be strictly regarded as a tort case. We also argue that a
rule of gross negligence or of gross violation of professional standards in
tort law can avoid the problems of underdeterrence as well as of overde-
terrence in the compensation of pure financial loss in tort. However, we
also argue that a wrong audit should lead to contractual liability, if it
was made to prepare the sale of a company or parts of it from inside
investors to outside investors or to prepare an initial public offering.
Ganuza and Gomez (2007) consider a framework where they analyse the
imposition of duties of care and reporting on gatekeepers, conditional
on their having observed an underlying wrongdoing or misconduct of
their clients. They make the assumption that the gatekeeper observes
the state of the world affecting misconduct, and that the public author-
ity (Courts or a regulator) are unable to verify whether misconduct had
or not been observed by the lawyer or auditor. However it is costlessly
verifiable ex post. The main results are that standards of professional
behavior by auditors or lawyers may well be sufficient as incentives, and
that the implications of the model tend to imply that the distinction
between voluntary violation of duties and mere negligence is not very
useful contrary to what is specified in existing Laws.
Criminal organization and corruption. A specific case of a crime in
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a team is corruption. Marjit and Shi (1998) and Jacquemet (2006) pro-
vide two different surveys of the strategic approach of corruption. One
of the main issue is not how to punish, but in contrast how to reward
a corrupted official in order to better control crime. Chappe and At
(2005,2008) develop two dynamic models of crime with and without in-
formation acquisition and study the conditions under which it is optimal
for a criminal to delay commission of a crime rather than committing
it immediately. They adress the issue of the optimal fine and level of
deterrence. However, they do not consider the question of how liability
may be allocated among the gang members. Garoupa (2000) provides a
comparison of criminal organizations such as maffias with governments,
and analyses the optimal contract between a gang member and the gang
authority. The mafia extorts a rent to criminals when they commit a
crime, which runs as a barrier to entry on the criminal market that
enables public authorities to save on enforcement costs. Nevertheless,
the models do not take into account the interactions within the gang
(the maffia is a moral personn) and thus does not consider the issue of
liability of the Principal.
A main reason explaining why the allocation of liability is neutral in
these works, comes from the fact that this a pure transfer between both
risk neutral parties, according to Shavell’s argument.
Privileggi and ali (2001) have focused on what occurs when one of
the party is risk averse. They assume that the (risk neutral) Principal
may delegate to the (risk averse) Agent the realization of the wrong-
doings, thus leading to an agency problem. The Agent exerts an effort
that negatively affects the probability of detection, but bears a cost in
utility terms. The Principal has the opportunity to perfectly observe the
decision of the Agent. In this framework, Privileggi and ali show that
shifting the liability upon the Agent, all else equal (holding constant both
the monetary sanctions and the probability of public detection), allows
to obtain larger deterrence effects on the Principal than when sanctions
only affect the Principal. Hence, a regime of exclusive sanctions (liabil-
ity) on the Agent favors a better public monitoring of illegal activity.
Nevertheless, they also show that the regime of exclusive sanction on
the Agent may induce him to exert more effort in cheating, which leads
to countervailing incentive effects on individuals who still find illegal be-
havior profitable: given that the probability of detection may be lower
than in the other regime, public authorities may be faced with greater
difficulties in repressing illegal activities. In the case where the Agent
displays constant absolute risk aversion, Privileggi and ali show that
there exists a kind of complementarity between the level of monetary
sanctions and the level of probability of detection: a calibration of their
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model exhibits that for any level of the CARA index, there always exists
a combination consisting in a probability of public detection and a level
of sanctions which allows to implement a small effort of cheating. Specif-
ically, ”strong” public enforcement policies based on large probability of
detection and at the same time high level of monetary sanctions render
the shift of the responsibility upon the Agent socially beneficial - that
is, it allows more Principal to renounce illegal behavior, and facilitates
public detection since Agents undertake less efforts in cheating.
Our papers takes a different view regarding two main behavioral
assumptions.
One the one hand, a the main feature of the analysis of Privileggi and
ali (2001) makes their framework close to the basic agency model of the
employer-employee - the Agent’s cost of the effort is expressed in utility
terms. In contrast, our paper introduces an alternative specification for
the technology of effort. We assume here that the illegal activity is costly,
i.e. individual who engage in it has to spend money coming from the use
of productive factors, which may be scarce and specific. The rational
for that is that when such offences are developed at a large scope, they
become strictly speaking a parallel economy requiring at a basic level the
coordination and cooperation between several individuals. Each may be
endowed with specific human and non human assets which are worth for
this activity: hence, corporate criminality is an industry. Remark that
when the assumption about individuals’ risk neutrality is relaxed, the
issue of the nature of the cost of effort matters, although it is irrelevant
in the case where individuals are risk neutral. Is it a monetary cost,
having the characteristics of the implicit technology of production to
which the effort is associated; or is it only the desutility of effort - which
may have monetary equivalent, but may be complementary to wealth?
The case for the monetary cost of effort, which seems actually to be
the widespread interpretation in the literature on Law & Economics,
is attractive but not simply for its realism. As it will be seen, it has
finally the main advantage to enable a complete characterization of the
various regimes of sanction, and specifically non ambiguous effects when
we proceed to a complete comparative statics analysis.
On the other hand, in this paper we allow a richer representation
of Agent’s preferences; we introduce the state-dependent approach more
usually used in the literature on safety and/or value of life analysis. The
rational for such an assumption is that, although we do not address
directly this issue here, these state-dependant preferences allow to take
into account the fact that public authorities may use non monetary sanc-
tions where criminal activities are detected and criminal individual are
arrested, such as: imprisonment, full or partial loss of civic rights and
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so on. The basic intuition says that individual even when engaged in
illegal activities have an intrinsic preference for freedom (not being de-
tected), and to the extent that going on with their wrongdoing is worth
to them, all else equal, such that they are better off when they have
the opportunity to cheat than when cannot. This is specifically what
the state-dependent representation allows with a parsimonious model of
individual preferences.
3 The model
Consider the case where the criminal activity or illegal behavior allows
the Principal to obtain a payment equal to B > 0. The Principal is not
the perpetrator of this malicious act, but he delegates1 it to an Agent,
who bears a monetary cost given by C(x) = x2. On the other hand,
the Principal rewards Agent’s efforts with a payment equal to w > 0 in
case of success, i.e. when the offences act has not been detected by the
authority. Let the aggregate technology of monitoring be characterized
by p(x) = p0 − pˆ(x), where p0 denotes public monitoring such as the
frequency of control by the public authority, and pˆ(x) corresponds to
the private efforts of concealing the illegal activity undertaken by the
Agent, where x is his effort or expenditures in wrongdoing.
Assumption 1:
1.1: pˆ′(x) = −p′(x) > 0, pˆ′′(x) = −p′′(x) < 0;
1.2: limx→∞ pˆ(x) = p0
Assumption 1.1 says that even if the Agent has the opportunity to
run counter to public efforts of detection, the marginal return of effort in
cheating become smaller and smaller - there nevertheless exist decreasing
returns to scale in this activity. Assumption 1.2 is introduced essentially
for technical reasons. It may be argued that as a matter of fact, the
Agent is not allowed to increase without any constraint his effort (x
may be only define on a subset [0, xmax], with xmax < ∞): hence, once
the maximum possible value is reached, public authorities may obtain
any deterrence effect without the threat of induced effects on the proba-
bility of detection. Nevertheless, from a social point of view the issue is
how much does it cost to reach the value xmax? The final section partly
investigates this point. We do not introduce explicitly the social welfare
1Monitoring the Agent’s efforts may be a costly activity for the Principal - never-
theless, assuming it entails only fixed costs, under perfect information these may be
seen as neglictable (set to zero) and are ignored in the following analysis.
2This assumption is made w.l.o.g.; alternatively, we could have had introduced a
C(x) satisfying C′(x) > 0 and C′′(x) ≥ 0. It can be verified that it adds nothing of
specific importance.
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objective, but we address the problem of the impact of the various in-
struments at the disposal of public authority, depending on whether or
not public authorities have limited resources in the monitoring of illegal
activities.
Let us focus on assumptions about individuals’ preferences.We as-
sume that the Principal is a risk neutral individual. In contrast, the
Agent is supposed to be a risk averse one, with a state-dependent repre-
sentation of his preferences, where u1 denotes his utility index when he
is not detected, while u0 denotes his utility index when he is detected.
Both utility functions are supposed to be strictly increasing and strictly
concave, and unique up to an affine transformation.
Although this is not the central topic of this paper, this representa-
tion enables to take into account various effects which are associated to
the detection of illegal activities: the Agent is suffering a psychological
penalty when he is caught, or more generally public authorities may ap-
ply non monetary sanctions in case where the fraudulent acts have been
observed, such as imprisonment, full or partial loss of civic rights and
so on. Hence all else equal, and to be short, we consider a case where
the Agent is better off when he is not detected as compared to the case
where he is. In order to represent this situation and be exhaustive about
this issue, we require additional assumptions to hold3:
Assumption 2: at all levels of Agent’s wealth:
2.1: u1 ≥ u0,
2.2: u′1 ≥ u
′
0,
2.3: −
u
′′
1
u′
1
≥ −
u
′′
2
u′
2
.
While these would appear as very strong conditions at first glance,
they have a great and intuitive appeal. The first one (2.1) implies gen-
erally that being caught is never beneficial for the Agent: whatever his
wealth (accumulated through illegal activities), he is better off when he
escapes from public detection. Relaxing such a condition would imply
that the Agent has an incentive to give himself up4, which may be seem
very strange on a priori grounds (up to pathological behaviors); more
over, such an assumption would introduce a bias in the following analy-
sis in favor of Agent’s liability. The second restriction (2.2) means that
3They have been extensively discussed and justified in the literature on self-
protection expenditures and/or willingness to pay for safety, health and life: see
Dehez and Drèze (1987), Jones-Lee (1974) for example.
4Remark that a less stringent condition may be obtained assuming only that
u1(w1) ≥ u0(w0) at least whenever w1 ≥ w0, i.e. soon as the Agent’s wealth when
not detected is higher than when he is, which is always satisfied in the following
analysis.
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each additional Euro has more value in the state where the Agent is
not detected than in the state where he is: the marginal contribution of
additional units of wealth to his welfare is larger when he is not detected
than when he is. Such a condition is required as far as we consider that
the effort corresponds to a normal good5.
Finally, (2.3) allows the Agent to be more sensible to risk when he is
not detected than when he is: according to (2.3), u1 displays more risk
aversion than u2 at all level of Agent’s wealth. While this last assump-
tion proved to be more meaningful if we were to consider that public
authorities may use the non monetary sanctions with different intensi-
ties but which cannot be precisely known by the Agent, it is sufficient
to obtain that the Willingness to Pay for Safety is also a normal good;
on the other hand, it is introduced here for practical motivations which
will be clearer later on6.
4 The consequences of exclusive sanctions
4.1 exclusive sanctions upon the Principal
The expected benefit obtained by the Principal when the illegal activity
is performed is equal to:
vP ≡max
w,x
(B − w − p(x)S) , s.t. : (1)
(1.1) : u1(w − x) ≥ k
Assuming that the Principal is a monopolist, we focus solely on the
case where the participation constraint of the Agent binds. In a such a
situation, the Principal demands an effort which is such that:
1
pˆ′(xP )
= S (2)
and pays a reward to the Agent equal to:
wP = u
−1
1 [k ] + xP (3)
By analogy with the literature on safety and/or the value of life, let
us consider that condition (2) says that for the equilibrium value of the
expenditures allotted to cheating and concealing the illegal activity (in
5That is, the effort increases when the Agent becomes richer. While we do not
explicitly address the issue here, the reader may refer to Dehez and Drèze (1987,
proposition 3.2) for an explicit analysis in the case of individual safety expenditures.
6Just remind that assumption 3 is usual in the literature when comparative statics
analysis is performed.
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terms of the level of Agent’s effort) then, the Social Marginal Cost of
Safety (LHS of (2)) which is nothing but the ratio between the Marginal
Cost of Cheating borne by the Agent to the marginal productivity of
Cheating for the Principal, is just equal to the Willingness to Pay for
Safety of the risk neutral Principal (RHS in (2)). Condition (3) means
that the payment to the Agent has to cover the total cost of his expen-
ditures in safety, up to some fixed cost (the constant u−11 [k ]) which may
be understood as representing the external opportunities of the Agent.
4.2 exclusive sanctions upon the Agent
Consider now that liability is delegated to the Agent, but that his choice
corresponding to the level of effort can be perfectly monitored by the
Principal. Now, the expected benefit obtained by the Principal when
the illegal activity is performed is equal to:
vA≡max
x,w
(B − w) , s.t. : (4)
(4.1) : U(x, w) ≥ k
with U(x, w) = p(x)u0(w − x− S) + (1− p(x))u1(w − x) = Eu.
In a such a situation, the Agent affords an effort such that7:
1
pˆ′(xA)
=
u1 − u0
Eu′
(5)
where Eu′ = p(xA)u
′
0(w− xA− S) + (1− p(xA))u
′
1(w− xA), and the
Principal pays the associated reward which is:
wA = u
−1
1 [k]− ecA (6)
where ecA < 0 denotes the certainty equivalent
8 of the risky prospect:
[(p(xA),−xA − S); (1− p(xA),−xA)]
at wA.
Interestingly enough, condition (5) says now that the equilibrium
value of the expenditures of safety (level of effort) chosen by the Agent
when he is liable, is such that the Marginal Cost of Safety (LHS of
(5)), is just equal to the Willingness to Pay for Safety of the risk averse
Agent (RHS in (5)). Condition (6) means that the payment to the Agent
has to cover the cost adjusted of the price of the risk associated to his
7See appendix 1 for SOC.
8See appendix 2.
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expenditure in cheating - and still up to some fixed cost (the constant
u−11 [k]).
4.3 comparative analysis of deterrence effects
One of the main attractive features of the present model is that it allows
a complete non ambiguous comparative statics analysis of the optimal
contract. To see this, let us first consider the main result of the paper
which is the following:
Proposition 1 All else equal:
i) vA ≤ vP .
ii) wA ≥ wP .
iii) xA ≥ xP .
Proof. i) By definition of vA, vP and ecA, and finally using (6) and
(3), we have:
vA≡ b− wA
= b−
[
u−11 [k] + xA + ecA
]
≤ b− u−11 [k]− xA − p(xA)S
≤max
x
(
b− u−11 [k]− x− p(x)S
)
≡ vP
Hence the result. ii) is a straightforward consequence of i), starting
with vA ≡ B−wA ≤ vP ≡ B−wP −p(xP )S implies that wP +p(xP )S ≤
wA; hence the result, given that p(xP )S > 0.
iii) Consider now conditions (2) and (5); if the Agent were risk neu-
tral, his WTP for safety would also be equal to S; as a result, it is not
so obvious on a priori ground whether xA  xP . However, remark that
by concavity of function u1, it comes that:
u1(w − xA) ≥ S.u
′
1(w − xA) + u1(w − xA − S)
Thus substracting each side with u0(w − xA − S), then dividing by
Eu′ and rearranging yields:
u1(w − xA)− u0(w − xA − S)
Eu′
≥S ×
u′1(w − xA)
Eu′
+
u1(w − xA − S)− u0(w − xA − S)
Eu′
≥S ×
u′1(w − xA)
Eu′
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given that u1(w−xA−S) ≥ u0(w−xA−S). Once more, by concavity
of u1, it is easy to check that for any p(x) > 0, then
u′
1
(w−xA)
Eu′
≥ 1 ⇔
u′1(w − xA) ≥ u
′
0(w − xA − S); hence:
u1(w − xA)− u0(w − xA − S)
Eu′
≥ S
saying that any risk averse (with a state-dependent representation
of preferences) decision maker will have a WTP for safety larger than a
risk neutral decision maker. To conclude, just remark finally that
(
1
pˆ′(x)
)
(LHS in (5)) is a increasing function of x: hence: xA ≥ xP .
As it is easy to check, the way liability is allotted does not matter in
the case where both the Principal and the Agent are risk neutral, since
the level of effort and the reward paid to the Agent are equal to xP
and wP respectively. In contrast, the way sanctions are allotted matters
under risk aversion as far as efficiency in liability setting is concerned.
Part i) of proposition 1 says that shifting liability from Principal to
Agent entails more deterrence effects on sleeping partners in criminal
and illegal activities: all else equal, the participation constraint of the
Principal binds in the Agent’s liability system before it binds in the
Principal’s liability one. But a straightforward consequence of part iii)
of proposition 1 is the following:
Corollary 2 All else equal, the probability of detection is smaller in the
Agent’s liability regime than in the Principal’s liability regime.
The driving force behind this last result is the size of the willing-
ness to pay of the team’s member who is liable. In each pure regime
of sanction and punishment, the Agent’s expenditures in cheating and
concealing the illegal activity basically reflects the willingness to pay of
the party in the crime who will bear the sanction in case of detection.
In fact, in a state-independent context, a risk neutral individual may
have a willingness to pay higher than a risk averse one9: this explains
the ambiguous findings by Privileggi, Marchese and Cassone (2001). In
contrast, in a state-dependent world, a risk neutral individual always has
a willingness to pay smaller than a risk averse one. As a result, Agent’s
efforts in avoiding detection and concealing the illegal activity are larger
when he is liable than when the Principal is. Hence shifting liability from
Principal to Agent may be socially worth according to deterrence effects
9See Langlais (2005) fro a general analysis.
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on Principals. But on the second hand, it becomes less easy to detect ille-
gal activities, since shifting the burden of the liability on the perpretator
of wrongdoings gives him more incentive to cheat. These countervailing
effects are well known since Arlen (1994) and Shavell (1997). This also
confirms the intuitions developed by Sanchirico (2005).
5 Comparative statics : probability versus penalty
In a second step, we compare the impact of the instruments which are
available to public authorities namely the level of monetary sanctions
and the frequency of control. An interesting point which deserves to
be highlighted is that when the Principal is legally liable, thus the main
instruments at the disposal of authorities to repress crimes and dishonest
behaviors, namely (p0, S) have far different effects depending on the
regime of liability.
Proposition 3 All else equal, in the regime of Principal’s liability:
i) The analysis of the comparative statics gives:
wP xP vP
p0 independent independent −
S + + −
ii) Increasing the frequency of controls have more deterrence effects
on Principals than raising the level of monetary sanctions.
Proof. i) To begin with, the frequency of control of illegal activities
- i.e. the choice of p0 by the authority - has no effect neither on the
effort undertaken by the Agent, nor on the payment he obtains from the
Principal. Further more, it has no effect of the Agent’s utility level, as
far as his participation constraint always binds. An increase in p0 simply
reduces the expected outcome of the Principal in this case:
∂vP
∂p0
= −S < 0
In contrast, an increase in the penalty S paid by the Principal when he
is detected induces effects, on the one hand, on the activity of the Agent
and on the payment he receives, since the Agent increases his effort and
receives a higher payment (the Principal gives him more incentives to
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invest in effort):
∂xP
∂S
=
1/S
p′′(xP )
−p′(xP )
> 0
∂wP
∂S
=
pˆ′(xP )
p′′(xP )
−p′(xP )
> 0
and on the expected utility level of the Principal on the second:
∂vP
∂S
= −p(xP ) = −(p0 − pˆ(xP )) < 0
the Agent being not affected by the increase in S.
ii) Soon as S > 1, S > p(xP ), hence the result.
To conclude for the moment about this regime, the monetary sanc-
tion proved to be a less efficient instrument to deter crime as compared
to the frequency of control, since the (direct) impact of the latter in-
strument on Principal’s satisfaction level is larger (in absolute value):
hence, the reservation utility of Principal may be more easily reached,
all else equal, without pervasive effects on the probability of detection -
since the increase in p0 has a one to one effect on the total probability
of criminals’ detection p(x) = p0 − pˆ(x), without any induced (addi-
tional) effects on pˆ(x) which may come from the protective measures
undertaken by the Agent. To the contrary, given that any increase in
the monetary sanction S leads the Agent to produce more effort, so that
the total probability of detection decreases, this second instrument has
effects which are more uncertain: the higher the sanction, the smaller
the probability of detection and the decrease in the Principal’s utility.
When the Agent is liable, the comparative statics analysis provides
richer results.
Proposition 4 All else equal, in the regime of Agent’s liability:
i) The analysis of the comparative statics gives:
wA xA vA
p0 + + −
S + + −
ii) When xA becomes large enough, raising the level of monetary
sanctions entails more deterrence effects on Principal than increasing
the frequency of controls.
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Proof. i) An increase in the probability of control first affects the
utility level of the Principal:
∂vA
∂p0
= −
u1 − u0
Eu′
< 0
with additional (induced) effects on the terms of contract between
the Principal and the Agent:
∂wA
∂p0
=
u1 − u0
Eu′
> 0
∂xA
∂p0
=
2
(
1
pˆ′(xA)
) [(
u′
1
−u′
0
Eu′
)
+ 1
2
(
1
pˆ′(xA)
) (
−Eu
′′
Eu′
)]
Ω
> 0
where Ω > 0 by the SOC (see appendix 1). An increase in the
sanctions have the following impact:
∂vA
∂S
= −p(xA)
(
u′0
Eu′
)
< 0
and the induced effects on the contract are:
∂wA
∂S
= p(xA)
(
u′0
Eu′
)
> 0
∂xA
∂S
=
(
u′
0
Eu′
) [
1 + p(x)
(
C′(xA)
pˆ′(xA)
)((
−Eu
′′
Eu′
)
−
(
−
u′′
0
u′
0
))
+ p(x)
(
u′
1
−u′
0
Eu′
)]
Ω
> 0
Remark that the numerator in ∂xA
∂S
should be of any sign, in the
absence of assumption 2.3 since, for any positive probability of being
caught: (
−
Eu′′
Eu′
)
≷
(
−
u′′0
u′0
)
⇐⇒
(
−
u′′1
u′1
)
≷
(
−
u′′0
u′0
)
Hence, assumption 2.3 is sufficient to obtain the (intuitive) positive
sign.
ii) It is easy to see that:
−
∂vA
∂p0
≷ −
∂vA
∂S
⇔ p0 ≷ p(xA) +
u1 − u0
Eu′
suggesting that as the Agent’s effort attains large values, p(xA) →
p0, and thus the monetary sanctions may become more efficient than
the probability of detection to deter Principals to undertake the illegal
activity since u1−u0
Eu′
> 0.
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As compared to the previous case, both instruments have now per-
vasive effects, since they give more incentives to the Agent in cheating:
the higher the intensity of public intervention, the harder the detection
of wrongdoing. Moreover, comparing the sensitivity of the Principal to
each of the instruments between regimes, we obtain:
Corollary 5 All else equal:
i) The higher the frequency of controls, the larger the advantages
of a Agent’s liability with respect to a Principal’s liability, in terms of
Principal’s deterrence.
ii) The larger the level of monetary sanction, the smaller the advan-
tages of a Agent’s liability with respect to a Principal’s liability, in terms
of Principal’s deterrence.
Proof. i) The proof is direct given that:
−
∂vA
∂p0
=
u1 − u0
Eu′
≥ −
∂vP
∂p0
= S : (A)
−
∂vA
∂S
= (p0 − pˆ(xP ))
(
u′0
Eu′
)
≤ −
∂vP
∂S
= p0 − pˆ(xP ) : (B)
ii) Using condition (B), it is direct that as xP → ∞, then −
∂vA
∂S
=
0 = −∂vP
∂S
, and thus vP → vA.
This last result means that the probability of detection is more ef-
ficient in the Agent’s liability system than in the Principal’s one, while
to the converse the monetary sanctions have more effects in the Prin-
cipal’s regime than in the Agent’s one such that for large value of the
sanctions both regimes tend to reach the same results on the deterrence
of Principal, roughly speaking.
6 Joint liability and sanctions
For practical purposes, a main criticism against the previous analysis is
that generally speaking, the penal code imposes that all the members in
a criminal teams will be punished in case of arrest. We now analyse in
our framework the consequences of joint liability in terms of deterrence.
Assume now that for a given level of public expenditures in deterrence
of criminal activities, the probability that the Agent be caught is p(x)q
where q ∈ (0, 1), while the probability that the Principal be caught is
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(1 − θ)p(x) where θ ∈ (0, 1). Let us denote fP and fA the penalty
inflicted respectively to the Principal and the Agent in case of arrest.
The optimal contract (xˆ, wˆ) is the solution to:
max
w,x
{(b− w − (1− θ)p(x)fP ) s.t. : U(x, w) ≥ k}
where:
U(x,w) = p(x)qu0(w − fA − x) + (1− p(x)q)u1(w − x)
corresponding to an effort which satisfies:
1
−p′(xˆ)
= q ×
u1(wˆ − xˆ)− u0(wˆ − fA − xˆ)
Eu′
+ (1− θ)× fP (7)
withEu′ = p(xˆ)qu′0(w−fA−xˆ)+(1−p(xˆ)q)u
′
1(w−xˆ), and a monetary
transfer given by:
wˆ = u−11 [k] + xˆ+ p(xˆ)qfA + pi1(wˆ − xˆ− p(xˆ)qfA) (8)
The structure of the RHS in (7), which is defined roughly speaking
as a weighted sum of two individual WTP, reflects that each one of the
Principal and the Agent have now to bear a specific kind of risk: on the
one hand, the risk of being detected; on the second, the risk of being
arrested and punished. These risks are reallocated through the contract;
as a consequence, the contractual effort is tailored to both the willingness
to pay of the Agent (first term in the RHS of (7)) and the willingness to
pay of the Principal (second term in the RHS of (7))10.
In the next proposition, we compare the regime of joint liability and
sanction with the case of exclusive sanction upon the Principal.
Proposition 6 Assume that (1− θ)fP ≤ f ≤ qfA + (1− θ)fP ; then:
i) xˆ ≥ xP .
ii) vˆ ≤ vP .
iii) wˆ ≥ wP .
10Thus, condition (7) mimics the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson condition which char-
acterizes the optimal production of public goods; detection avoidance may be seen
as a club good, whose optimal level has to be tailored to the willingness to pay of the
members of the club up to the specific investments in prosecution and punishment
of enforcers.
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Proof. i) Let us compare the RHS in (7) and (2), for a given value
of (w, x); by assumption of concavity, the first term in the RHS of (7)
satisfies: u1−u0
Eu′
≥ fA (see the proof of part iii) in proposition 1). Hence,
under the assumption f ≤ qfA + (1− θ)fP , we have:
q
u1 − u0
Eu′
+ (1− θ)fP ≥ qfA + (1− θ)fP ≥ f
According to (7) and (2), this implies that 1
−p′(xˆ)
≥ 1
−p′(xP )
; hence the
result follows.
ii) According to (8), we obtain:
vˆ≡ b− wˆ − (1− θ)p(xˆ)fP
≤ b− u−11 [k]− xˆ− p(xˆ) (qfA + (1− θ)fP )
≤max
x
(
b− u−11 [k]− x− p(x) (qfA + (1− θ)fP )
)
which is nothing else but the definition of vP where qfA+(1−θ)fP has
been substituted for f ; but as it is easy to verify (applying the envelop
theorem), vP is a decreasing function of f . Thus, it is straightforward
to see that if: f ≤ qfA + (1− θ)fP then we also have:
vˆ≤max
x
(
b− u−11 [k]− x− p(x) (qfA + (1− θ)fP )
)
≤ vP = max
x
(
b− u−11 [k]− x− p(x)f
)
Finally, part iii) is a straightforward consequence of part i) and ii):
if (1− θ)fP ≤ f , we have according to i):
wˆ − wP ≥ p(xP )f − (1− θ)p(xˆ)fP ≥ p(xP ) (f − (1− θ)fP ) ≥ 0
given that p(xˆ) ≤ p(xP ).
Proposition 3 implies that for mild conditions about the choice of
fines, the regime of joint liability/mixed sanctions allows to obtain larger
effects in terms of crime deterrence than the regime of exclusive sanc-
tions upon the Principal; nevertheless, this also yields more difficulties
in detecting the crime, since the Agent have more incentives to invest in
activities avoiding public detection.
A direct comparison between (5) and (7) is quite intractable. Thus,
in order to compare the regime of joint liability and sanction and the
case of exclusive sanction upon the Agent, let us proceed in a different
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way. Intuitively speaking, there is no discontinuity between the regime
of mixed sanction/liability and the regime of exclusive sanction upon
the Agent: it is easily seen that starting from the former and raising
continuously the probabilities θ and q up to their maximal value 1, we
reach the second regime. Hence, we first study the comparative statics in
the regime of joint sanction; then, we use these results in order identify
the sufficient conditions which are required to compare both regimes. In
appendix 3, it is shown that:
Proposition 7 All else equal:
i) xˆ is an increasing function of q and a decreasing function of θ;
moreover, if fA ≥ fP then xˆ is more sensible to q than to θ, i.e.
∂xˆ
∂q
>
−∂xˆ
∂θ
.
ii) vˆ is a decreasing function of q and an increasing function of θ;
moreover, if fA ≥ fP then vˆ is more sensible to q than to θ, i.e. −
∂vˆ
∂q
>
∂vˆ
∂θ
.
The previous propositions implies that the level of avoidance activity
which is the solution to (7) when the fine and the probabilities of detec-
tion and punishment are set to the level (fA, q, θ) is larger than when
those variables are equal to (fA, 1, 1); i.e. xˆ(fA, q, θ) ≤ xˆ(fA, 1, 1) - and
in contrast the corresponding expected profit for the Principal is smaller:
i.e. vˆ(fA, q, θ) ≤ vˆ(fA, 1, 1). Given that xˆ(fA, 1, 1) is by definition the
solution to (5) where f has been substituted by fA, and that xA is an
increasing function of f , a straightforward consequence is:
Corollary 8 Assume that fP ≤ fA ≤ f ; then:
i) xˆ ≤ xA.
ii) vˆ ≥ vA.
The regime of mixed sanction entails (under reasonable conditions
regarding the choice of fines) less crime deterrence but more detection
than a regime of unilateral sanction upon the Agent.
Remark that in order to compare our different regimes, we have ob-
tain sufficient conditions which may deserve some comments.
First, let us consider the sufficient condition of proposition 3 (which
implies the various values of the fines): (1−θ)fP ≤ f ≤ qfA+(1−θ)fP ;
remark that the LHS inequality is satisfied (but not uniquely) soon as:
fP ≤ f ; if this inequality holds, then the RHS inequality may be written
as: f − fP ≤ qfA − θfP , and it must be finally that qfA ≥ θfP holds.
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On the other hand, the sufficient conditions of proposition 4 and
corollary 5 together require:
fP ≤ fA ≤ f
Once more, these conditions are only sufficient to guarantee the re-
sults; nevertheless they suggest that:
- as the enforcer focuses its monitoring efforts on one member of
the criminal team (either the leader, or the active agent) rather than
on both members, thus raising the corresponding specific probability of
detection up to its potential maximal level, then it is recommended to
also use larger fines (f) than the level which is individually applied in
case of joint liability and sanction;
- at the same time, the total expected amount of fines raised by the
enforcer in case of joint liability must be at least as large as the level
applied in case of exclusive sanction;
- finally, it is suggested that in case of joint liability and sanction,
the individual sanction/fine both in level and expected terms, which are
applied to the active partner must be at least as large as those raised on
the sleeping partner/leader of the team.
With respect to the state-dependent characteristics of Agent’s pref-
erences, which enable to encompass cases where enforcers use non mon-
etary sanctions: our results suggest that they are consistent the usual
view on the use of fine and imprisonment; as the probability of convinc-
ing the Agent increases so is the level of the fine put on him, although
prison sentencing or any other non monetary sanction be used at the
same time.
7 Conclusion
The paper has addressed the issue of the choice of a regime of sanction
in order to control criminal teams activities. It has followed a basic pos-
itive view according to previous works such as Privileggi, Marchese and
Cassone (2001). But in contrast, the results are qualified here (almost all
the time) in a general and non ambiguous way, allowing us to evaluate
how the nature of the activity of detection avoidance together with the
existence of a cooperative/non cooperative behavior between partners
in a criminal team, facilitates the action of enforcers. We also have in-
troduced (at least implicitly) more policy instruments than in previous
studies: in addition to the monitoring activity of enforcers and the use of
monetary sanctions in case of arrest, we have assumed that authorities
have the opportunity to apply non monetary sanctions (prison sentence,
loss of civil rights, incapacitation and so on); this enables us to consider
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that (at least some) criminals have state-dependent preferences with dif-
ferent utility indexes depending on whether a criminal is or not arrested
and punished.
The first main result of the paper is about the effects of liability
shifting between the members of a criminal organization (we compare
pure regimes of sanction in this set up) when they have specialized tasks
in the team and a different sensibility to the risk of arrest and punish-
ment. Specifically, we assume here that the perpretator of the crime is a
state-dependent risk averse individual, and that he bears a (linear) mon-
etary cost du to the activity of detection avoidance, whereas the leader
is risk neutral and bears only fixed costs (due to general management of
the team and the monitoring of the members). In this set up, we have
shown as in Privileggi, Marchese and Cassone (2001)’s paper that ex-
clusive sanctions upon the Agent/perpretator of the crime induces more
deterrence of the Principal (leader of the team) than a regime of ex-
clusive sanctions upon the Principal: it is more efficient to punish the
« weaker » individual alone (more sensible to the risk of sanctions), in
the sense that the frequency of crime is smaller. But the counterpart of
this result (see also Sanchirico (2006)) is that it becomes more difficult
for public authorities to detect illegal activities, in the sense that the
frequency of detection and punishment becomes smaller in the former
regime. We have shown that both results occur whatever the value of
the fine, and the intensity of the public monitoring (likelihood of con-
trols), which is in contrast with Privileggi and ali (2001)’s analysis for
state-independent risk averse Agent having a desutility for efforts in the
detection avoidance activity.
The second main result of the present paper is about the effects of a
regime of «joint liability and sanction»: we have shown that it implies
more deterrence than the regime of exclusive sanction upon the leader,
but with a cost since « joint liability » also reduces the effectiveness
of public monitoring as compared to the second regime, once again. It
means that it is more efficient to punish both partners in a criminal teams
than the «stronger partner» (leader) alone, since the probability of crime
is smaller when both bear a sanction - albeit, the frequency of detection
of the team is smaller. In contrast, there is unfortunately no reason to
believe that it is also more efficient to punish both partners than the
« weaker » alone; maybe this is not the case: more conditions over
basic assumptions regarding the technology of avoidance and individual
preferences are required (not found here).
In this paper, we have followed a descriptive view on the issue of
criminal teams. This point of view has to be motivated, given that
there exists a large body of literature focusing rather on the optimal en-
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forcement of the penal code (see Garoupa (1997), Polinsky and Shavell
(2000). On the one hand, it is well known that introducing risk aversion
leads to puzzling results regarding the design of the optimal law enforce-
ment policy (see Polinsky and Shavell (1979), Neilson (1998)): under
risk aversion, maximal fines and small probability of control may be or
not optimal, depending on whether criminals are more or less sensible
to the frequency than to the severity of the sanction (see also (Neilson
and Winter (1997)). On the other hand, it must be reminded that there
exist other goals of criminal law, notably incapacitation, rehabilitation,
and retribution (see Shavell (1987)). Our paper may be understood as
suggesting that there exist cases where these different goals (such as the
incapacitation of all the gang members) may compet with the deterrence
objective.
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APPENDIX 1
Checking explicitly second order conditions of maximization may be
useful there after, let us totally differentiate the FOC (5) written as
−Eu′ + p′[u0−u1] = 0, the SOC require that:
Eu′′ − Eu′ + p′′ (u0 − u1) + 2 (−p
′) (u′0 − u
′
1) ≤ 0
which may also be written after some straightforward but tedious
manipulations as Ω×Eu′ ≥ 0, where:
Ω=
(
1
−p′(xA)
)(
p′′(xA)
−p′(xA)
)
+2
[(
u′1 − u
′
0
Eu′
)
+
1
2
(
1
−p′(xA)
)(
−
Eu′′
Eu′
)]
≥ 0
where −p′(xA) = pˆ
′(xA) and p
′′(xA) = −pˆ
′′(xA). Remark that Ω is
used when we turn to the analysis of comparative statics. Remark also
that assumption 2.2 is a sufficient condition for SOC to hold.
APPENDIX 2
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In our set up, state 0 corresponds to the case where the Agent is
detected and caught by the public authorities, while state 1 is the state
where he is not caught. Consider any gamble defined as: (p(x), w0; (1−
p(x)), w1). Thus, the certainty equivalent at wealth w may be defined as
the amount of wealth which is accepted by the Agent to be not detected
by the authority and to have the same level of satisfaction as the gamble
itself:
p(x)u0(w0) + (1− p(x))u1(w1)
=u1(w + ec)
=u1(p(x)w0 + (1− p(x))w1 − pi1(w; p(x)w0 + (1− p(x))w1))
with pi1(.) > 0 denoting the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk premium as-
sociated to u1. Hence, defining w0 = w − x − S, and w1 = w − x, we
have: ec = −x− p(x)S − pi1(w;−x− p(x)S)
APPENDIX 3
Let us define the function:
λ(fA, q) = q
u1(w−x)−u0(w−fA−x)
p(x)qu′
0
(w−fA−x)+(1−p(x)q)u
′
1
(w−x)
which takes positive values on its domain × [0, 1].
• Differentiating the system (7)-(8) in q and rearranging yields:
D
∂x
∂q
= Ω
∂w
∂q
+
λ(fA, q)
q
(
1 + p(x)q
u′1 − u
′
0
p(x)qu′0 + (1− p(x)q)u
′
1
)
(λ(fA, q)(−p
′)− 1)
∂x
∂q
= −
∂w
∂q
+ p(x)
λ(fA, q)
q
where:
D =
(
p′′
(p′)2
+Ω++λ(fA, q)(−p
′)q
u′
1
−u′
0
p(x)qu′
0
+(1−p(x)q)u′
1
)
> 0, and:
Ω = q
u′
1
−u′
0
p(x)qu′
0
+(1−p(x)q)u′
1
+ λ(fA, q)
(
−Eu
′′
Eu′
)
> 0, under assumption 2.
Solving for ∂x
∂q
leads to:
∂x
∂q
=
λ(fA, q)
q
×
1 + p(x)
(
Ω + q
u′
1
−u′
0
p(x)qu′
0
+(1−p(x)q)u′
1
)
D +Ω(λ(fA, q)(−p′)− 1)
The denominator is positive according to the SOC; the numerator is
also positive: this implies that ∂x
∂q
> 0.
As a result, we also have the impact on the Principal’s expected
return is: ∂v
∂q
= −λ(fA,q)
q
p(x) < 0.
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• Differentiating the system (7)-(8) in θ and rearranging yields:
D
∂x
∂θ
= Ω
∂w
∂θ
− fP
(λ(fA, q)(−p
′)− 1)
∂x
∂θ
= −
∂w
∂θ
Solving for ∂x
∂θ
leads to:
∂x
∂θ
=
−fP
D +Ω(λ(fA, q)(−p′)− 1)
hence implying that ∂x
∂θ
< 0.
As a result, we also have: ∂v
∂θ
= p(x)fP > 0.
• Finally, remark that if fA ≥ fP then
λ(fA,q)
q
≥ fA ≥ fP =⇒
∂x
∂q
>
−∂x
∂θ
: when both θ and q increase, then x increases; moreover, if
fA ≥ fP then
λ(fA,q)
q
≥ fA ≥ fP =⇒ −
∂v
∂q
> ∂v
∂θ
: when both θ and
q increase, then v decreases.
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